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Abstract 
 
In this work, we present our early stage results on a 
Conflicts Check Protocol (CCP) that enables preventing 
potential attacks on bitcoin system. Based on the 
observation and discovery of a common symptom that 
many attacks may generate, CCP refines the current 
bitcoin systems by proposing a novel arbitration 
mechanism that is capable to determine the approval or 
abandon of certain transactions involved in confliction. 
This work examines the security issue of bitcoin from a new 
perspective, which may extend to a larger scope of attack 
analysis and prevention.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Bitcoin [1-5] has been very popular since its invention 
nine years ago and so far had over 8.8 million users [3] and 
the market cap for Bitcoin has reached over 91B USD as 
of October 2017. In Bitcoin system, a peer-to-peer (P2P) 
network is formed via the basic element of node (or called 
“client” or “peer”), and each node maintains a list of other 
nodes’ IP addresses for communicating. The operations of 
Bitcoin transaction (like cash payment) consistency purely 
rely on a mechanism called Block Chain, which is 
composed of batches of approved transactions that have 
been grouped together (called “block”). Each block 
contains a cryptographic hash of its predecessor, so that 
blocks can form (one or more) block chains. The block 
chain thus forms an incremental log of all transactions that 
have ever occurred since the first block of block chain. This 
way, every transfer of money can be verified by reading the 
log from start to end. With the growth of the block chain, 
newly created blocks are flooded through the network to 
ensure all nodes possess them, thus ideally the ownership 
of every fraction of a bitcoin is aware and agreed by all 
nodes in the system, which in reality requires tremendous 
efforts in maintaining information consistency and 
capability to handle conflictions.  
Bitcoin system is designed in the rational of “the block 
is easy to verify but hard to create’, that is, the valid blocks 
are required to contain a proof-of-work, which requires 
tremendous computation and many guessing efforts. A 
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longest-chain rule is adopted to resolve conflicts, that is, 
the one requires highest aggregate difficulty of proof-of-
work computations will be adopted. This way the network 
will eventually converge by removing conflicts.  
Due to the natural of distributed system, Bitcoin system 
still faces many attacks [2, 6]. Double spending attack is a 
common one that an attacker tries to make two conflicting 
transactions at the same time in order to double use one 
single payment. On the other hand, if a miner (attacker) 
controls enough computational resource, he/she can mine 
a conflicting block chain long enough to overtake the 
current main chain, which is forking attack. For example, 
the attacker broadcast to the network a transaction in which 
the attacked merchant is paid by the attacker and wait the 
confirmation of the transaction and goods from the 
merchant; Then the attacker secretly mines a conflicting 
block chain containing a conflicting transaction which pays 
the attacker himself instead of the merchant; After that the 
attacker extends the secret block chain until it overtakes the 
public chain. As another example, (which has not been 
discussed before) an attacker collects transactions that are 
spent but not mined in block chain, and then mines a 
conflicting block containing conflicting transactions, 
which pay to the attacker instead of their original receivers. 
Clearly, this attack is much severer because the attacker 
changes transactions that are sent by anyone.  
In this work, we propose a novel mechanism, called 
Conflicts Check Protocol (CCP) that can reduce the chance 
of many attacks to minimum. CCP is based on an 
observation that many attacks are having a common 
symptom that there are more than one transaction sharing 
a same input, thus it is critical to effectively detect such 
risky symptom. CCP proposes a novel arbitration process 
to solve these conflicts after the detection. The paper is 
organized as follows: in the second section, the common 
symptom of many attacks is demonstrated. In section 3, the 
CCP mechanism is proposed. The future value, opening 
topics, and extensibility of CCP are discussed in the last 
section with the final conclusion. 
 
2. Conflicts Symptom of Many Attacks  
 
As mentioned earlier, a transaction containing bitcoin 
needs to be validated by all nodes of the system. A 
transaction normally contains one or more inputs that 
represent the senders of the bitcoins, and one or more 
outputs that represent the receivers of the bitcoins. A 
received bitcoin cannot be used until the corresponding 
transaction has been validated by other nodes. The 
transactions are flooded within Bitcoin P2P network so that 
each node gets notified for these transactions. All nodes 
need to repeat verification work of transaction 
independently, including checking double spending and 
other validation rules. Like other attacks, double spending 
happens when conflicting transactions attempt to transfer 
the exact same bitcoin to different destinations. When there 
are conflicting transactions (i.e., they carry the same 
bitcoin) in a P2P network, the node observing conflicts 
typically approve the first transaction it receives based on 
flood algorithm, as it does not have a mechanism to report 
the confliction observed after receiving the second 
transaction with a same input. Block chain can solve some 
attacks having this symptom (i.e., conflicts) but not all of 
them, for example, forking attacks cannot be solved 
completely. This important symptom can be caught by 
CCP to fix these attacks.  
Clearly, there are other ways attackers choose to use [7-
8] that may not have such symptom. In this work, we are 
focus on the type of symptom that can be easily detected 
by each node based on the transaction conflicts observed to 
have at least one same input. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example showing relationship among nodes, 
transactions and inputs in Bitcoin system 
As shown in Fig. 1, there are multiple nodes in the 
system (e.g., k1 nodes in total), each node approves 
multiple transactions (assuming in total of k2 transactions 
in the system), which is indicated by the arrow in the figure. 
It is also important to realize that Transaction 1 and 
Transaction 2 in the figure are conflicting with each other 
as they share a same input (i.e., Input 1). Lines indicate the 
relationship of connect. Node 1 is connected to Node 2 
(and some other nodes). Node 2 is also connected to Node 
1.In the next section, we will discuss the mechanism used 
to remove chances of attacks after detecting this type of 
symptom related to transaction conflicts. 
 
3. CCP – Conflicts Check Protocol 
 
CCP is built on top of Bitcoin system, it modifies the 
system in the following aspects: 
 The interactions between node and transaction: in 
Bitcoin system, a transaction is either approved or 
refused by a node; in CCP, the approval state is split 
into 2 states, namely, tentatively approved and final 
approved. A node can tentatively approve a 
transaction, but later on, if confliction is detected, the 
node will report the observed confliction to an 
arbitrator, where an arbitration mechanism will 
communicate with connected nodes and help the node 
to decide whether continue tentatively approving the 
transaction or tentatively refuse it. 
 In CCP, conceptually the time domain is equally 
divided into many intervals, and there is an action 
point in each time interval that all nodes can take 
actions only at these points, thus at every action point, 
nodes of the whole network conduct an update (e.g., 
tentatively approve a transaction, raise arbitration, or 
receive the arbitration outcome from other connected 
nodes at last action point and change its own 
arbitration). For example, when a node detects a 
transaction conflict at an input, it triggers the 
arbitration mechanism, when the arbitration outcome 
is returned, it may tentatively approve the later-
coming transaction at the input, or tentatively approve 
the earlier-tentatively approved one, or decide to 
abandon all transactions at the input. It is important to 
realize that in any time, it is not possible for a node to 
tentatively approve more than one transaction for a 
specific input. 
 An arbitrator and corresponding arbitration 
mechanism is deployed to resolve conflicts. As 
shown in Fig. 2, an example of arbitrator for Input 1 
of Node 1 is demonstrated, where Node 1 realized that 
both Transaction 1 and Transaction 2 it received 
contains the same Input 1 and thus raised a confliction. 
All transactions that have input 1 (i.e., Transaction 1 
and Transaction 2), are treated as transactions in 
confliction by the arbitrator. The arbitrator uses a few 
rounds of voting to determine whether there is a 
transaction can be approved at this input or all 
transactions need to be abandoned. There are only 
two possible outcomes of arbitration in each round: 
either a transaction becomes the one in Domination 
(see example in Fig. 2 that Transaction 1 is judged to 
win out other transactions) and then the node 
tentatively approves that transaction, or no one in 
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domination and thus all transactions in confliction are 
abandoned. When starting the arbitration mechanism 
of input 1, node 1 tentatively approves the transaction 
it receives first that contains input 1. At each action 
point mentioned above, the arbitrator communicates 
with the connected nodes involved (as shown in Fig. 
2 the node 2 group and the node 3 group), and 
determine the arbitration outcome. After several 
rounds, at each input, each node has big enough 
possibility to have the same arbitration (domination 
or abandon) as each other node’s (see below the 
mathematically proof), then the tentative approval 
(and tentative abandon) becomes final approval (final 
abandon) and cannot change any more. Only if the 
node finally approves a transaction at every input that 
is contained in this transaction, the node finally 
approves this transaction; the node will finally refuse 
the transaction in any other final arbitration outcome. 
 In CCP, only a fixed number of connected nodes (say 
H) are considered in the voting process of arbitration. 
Although the node in classic Bitcoin system is 
allowed to connect with 8-128 nodes, our 
experiments indicate that the selection of H does not 
have significant impact on our conclusion. Once the 
H is determined by the system, it will be utilized in 
all arbitration processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of the arbitration mechanism 
 
It is important to realize that the arbitration made by the 
arbitrator according to the voting process by the connected 
nodes with their tentatively approvals at an input is 
theoretically with high confidence level. Let us denote by 
m the number of transactions in confliction currently 
handling at the arbitrator of an input, h[1], h[2] …h[m] the 
numbers of connected nodes that tentatively approved 
these m different transactions at that input respectively. 
According to flood algorithm, each node has to tentatively 
approve a transaction or choose to abandon at the input at 
each action point. Let us also denote by h[m+1] the number 
of connected nodes that choose abandon. H is the sum of 
all connected nodes and then the arbitration process can be 
formally defined by using the following pseudocodes :  
 
0   Initialize – start timer (from 0)  
1 while (timer++ < Action Point E) do 
2   outcome = “abandon” 
3   update h[*] based on information periodically 
received from connected nodes during last time interval 
4   for i=1 to m do 
5  if (h[i]/H > r)  // r is a threshold 
6     then outcome = {“domination”, i}; break; 
 
In this work, we assume the P2P network is large 
enough and thus the connections between nodes and the 
behavior model of nodes are quite random. In a random 
process, we can assume that any 2 randomly picked nodes 
have similar probability to tentatively approve a single 
transaction. Let us denote by p the probability of each 
connected node to tentatively approve a transaction at an 
input, then h[i] obeys Binomial Distributions [9], which 
has the following probability:  
   P(h[i]=x)=b(x,H,p)=   
 *  *(1 −  )        (1) 
Assuming    is the possibility that a node tentatively 
approves this transaction in arbitration process after a time 
interval, then 
     =P(
 [ ]
 
>r)                         (2) 
It is important to realize that    is the value of p after 
a time period. According to central limit theorem, Binomial 
Distribution can be approximated to Normal distribution. 
So 
      =P(
 [ ]
 
>r)→ P(u>
     
   (   ))
| ~ (0,1))   (3) 
that is, 
      = 
 
√  
∫    (−
  
 
)
 
     
   (   ))
        (4) 
 
If we use a function called   ( )  to represent the 
relationship between     and original p in Eq. (4), 
like     =    ( ) , it can be observed that   ( )  is 
monotone, and   ( ) is the also the value of p after 1 time 
interval in arbitration process. In the same manner, 
  (  ( ))  is the value of p after 2 time intervals in 
arbitration process;   (  (  ( ))) is the value of p after 
3 time intervals, and   
 ( ) is the value p after n time 
intervals. Following equation (4), we are also able to derive 
the exact function of   
 ( ) . When we compare the 
functions of   
 ( ) in Fig. 3 with different value of n, we 
observe that the slope of function gets steeper with the 
increase of n. 
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Figure 3. The relationship of p and   
 ( ) (n=2 3 and 
4) when H=100 
 
Figure 4. The relationship of n and the length of 
uncertain region with different voting number 
 
Figure 5. The relationship of n and log(the length of 
uncertain region) with different voting number 
 
In Fig. 3, when p>0.69,   (  ( ))=1, which means all 
nodes tentatively approve the transaction after 2 time 
intervals and that won’t change in the rest of the time. 
When p<0.64,   (  ( )) =0, which means all nodes 
tentatively do not approve the transaction after 2 time 
intervals and that does not change in the rest of the time. 
When 0.64<p<0.69, nodes may not get common view 
during arbitration process in 2 time intervals. So (0.64,0.69) 
is the uncertain region of arbitration process after 2 time 
intervals. It is important to realize that the size of uncertain 
region is getting smaller and smaller with the increase of n, 
it becomes 0.005 when n=3, 0.0008 when n=4, and smaller 
than 10-6 when n>=6 (as shown in Fig. 4), and the size 
decrease very fast when n further increase (as shown in Fig. 
5). In Figs. 4 and 5, the relationship of n and H are 
demonstrated. Clearly, smaller H (e.g. H=16) corresponds 
to longer convergence speed, however, all settings of H 
indicates that the size of uncertain region can be reduce to 
a value very close to 0 as the increase of n.     
It is not hard to understand that when the size of 
uncertain region is too small to become negligible (e.g., 
when n>12), we can claim that at certain action point (after 
several rounds of voting) CCP has full confidence that all 
nodes will be consistent on either select a single transaction 
for approval, or choose to abandon all transactions in 
confliction.  
 
4. Conclusion and Discussions 
 
In this paper, a novel approach to detect and resolve 
attacks, called CCP, is proposed. It is based on an 
observation that in many attacks a common symptom 
appears, that is, there is more than one transaction sharing 
a same input. After detecting this symptom, a novel 
arbitration mechanism is proposed in CCP to resolve the 
conflicts. 
 This work is still in its very early stage, some of its 
assumption has not been fully verified in simulation, for 
example, the model of using a same probability for each 
connected node to tentatively approve a transaction at an 
input. However, it is worth noting that CCP opens a new 
door for bitcoin system, and we believe it will play 
significant roles in maintaining consistency, and it may 
also be used for other attacks detection and resolution by 
covering more extensive symptoms discovery. 
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Appendix 
Another kind of forking attack—may be 1 million 
severer than classic forking attack 
 
Another kind of forking attack, which can be called 
custom block attack, has not been noticed before: an 
attacker collects transactions that are spent but not mined 
in block chain, and then mines a conflicting block 
containing conflicting transactions, which pay to the 
attacker instead of their original receivers. In classic 
forking attack, the attacker only changes transaction that 
is sent by himself while in custom block attack, the 
attacker changes transactions that are sent by anyone. 
Both two kinds of forking attack are changing the 
transactions’ outputs in blocks so custom block attack is 
operational. The results discussing classic forking attack 
in [6] can be applied to custom block attack easily but 
custom block attack is much severer than double spending 
attack with two reasons: 1, a block usually has over a 
thousand transactions so a succeed custom block can 
make more than a thousand times of profits than double 
spending attack; 2, custom block attack may be succeeded 
with fewer secret blocks mined. Generally double 
spending in forking attack needs the attacker mines a 
secret block chain with at least 6 blocks longer than the 
public chain [5] [10], but the length requirement of the 
secret block chain in custom block attack is decided by 
miners instead of the merchant that gets paid. In default 
situation, miners should accept the longest block chain so 
custom block attack may succeed with only 1 secret block 
faster than public chain, corresponding 1-confirmation 
attack in [6]. The possibility of 1-confirmation attack 
(custom block attack) is about 1 thousand times higher 
than 6-confirmation attack (double spending) so the 
benefit cost ratio of custom block attack may be 1 million 
times higher than double spending in forking attack. 
